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I. The Process of Emergence: Where
Did It Start - Where Does It Go?
The development of well-functioning financial markets is indisputably one of
the decisive factors of a successful transition to a market economy. The Czech
experience
1 can offer an insight into the complexity of the process of their
emergence. In order to understand that, it is necessary to emphasize the initial pre-
reform situation. In 1990 - year “zero” of the reform, the Czech Republic started its
transition path with a one-tier state banking system, without institutions fundamental
to financial markets such as a stock exchange or investment funds, and with non-
convertible currency. The group of financial assets available to the private sector
was very homogenous since the only existing financial markets (although very
distorted by central planning) were those with deposit, loans and foreign exchange.
                                                
1 The paper analyzes  the emergence of the Czech financial  markets. Hence it refers to
the Czech experience even for the period of 1990-1992 during which the Czech Republic was a
part of the former Czechoslovakia.8
The markets with short-term bills, state or corporate bonds, shares and derivatives
were completely absent. Saving and investing activities facilitated by the state
financial system were inefficient. Some economic actions such as risk-trading
between heterogeneous economic agents were not supplied by the financial system
at all.
It follows that there was a very long way ahead of a transitional economy in
order to develop well-functioning financial markets. In this paper, it is suggested to
distinguish the three essential stages of the development process: ( i) the
emergence of financial institutions of two types: those providing a framework for
financial markets as well as those playing on them, (ii) the emergence of financial
markets that in most cases required some leading institution to introduce previously
non-existent financial asset, and finally, (iii) the improvement as well as significant
broadening of economic activities facilitated by the markets. The similar
methodology can be used when analyzing the process of emergence of financial
markets in other transitional countries. For all three stages, there is a crucial factor
of development - the presence of the institutional leader. In the Czech Republic, the
first two stages were driven both from the top down by institutional  transformation
as well as from the bottom up by the responses of the private sector to the
government’s privatization scheme, financial liberalization or policies of the central
bank. The third stage had proven to be a difficult and lasting process.
There has been intense discussion in economic literature on the topic of
where would newly emerged financial markets go. Corbett, Mayer (1991) provide an
excellent overview of this discussion. According to them, there are two main
alternatives: (i) the market model that is associated with the US economy in which
the stock market plays an important role, investment and commercial activities are
separated, hostile takeovers take place, and the outside system is a method of
corporate control, or (ii) the banking model which is associated with a majority of
developed countries (continental Europe or Japan) that have general banking
systems where  banks hold equities, sit on the boards of firms, and there are cross-9
share-holdings between companies, concentrated ownership of quoted companies,
and an inside system of corporate control.
Corbett, Mayer (1991) argue that the banking model should have been the
target of financial reform since transitional economies are closer to continental
Europe in many aspects, and moreover, the advantages of the market model are
outweighed by its disadvantages.
2 Hence the backbone of economic development
in transitional economies should be the formation of an effective banking sector
related closely to a privatized enterprise sector. Also, it is suggested that banks
should not be involved in speculative and short-term activities. It is concluded that
financial reforms in transitional countries were designed in order to approach the
market model. On the contrary, the analysis of the Czech experience presented in
this paper demonstrates that the financial system has converged to the banking
model during transition. Although the privatization strategy of the government
contributed to the development of the equity market, the commercial banks became
the major players since they were funded as universal banks and allowed to
participate in the voucher privatization scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. The emergence of the financial
institutions is analyzed in the second section (Main Players on the Czech Financial
Markets). The central bank and the government are identified as leaders on the
                                                
2 The reasons of disadvantages outweighing advantages in the market model are
summarized in  Stiglitz (1990) as the new paradigm. According to him, there are several
important problems that were overlooked by the previous literature analyzing the financial
systems: the imperfect and costly information (adverse selection problem), contracts are difficult
and costly to enforce (enforcement problem), managers do not act in interests of shareholders
(incentives problem) and the ownership is too wide spread to ensure monitoring (free rider
problem). Hence in the market model collected funds often do not promote economic growth
since the system suffers from hostile takeovers, profits are channeled to managers instead of the
firms or shareholders, and investment horizon is shortened. In the banking model, outside
investors are provided with debt contracts, and the risk of the project as well as the costs of
screening and monitoring  are beard by the small group of inside investors -usually banks- who
have the power to enforce contracts, know-how to analyze information, and who take the profit10
financial markets, and the major commercial banks as the most important private
players that have gained their position in a bottom to top process initiated by
voucher privatization. The emergence of the financial markets is examined in the
third section (Financial Markets in Transition: Structure, Reasons for Emergence
and Depth of the Czech Financial Markets). After five years of transition, the
structure of the Czech financial markets was as follows. The money market, foreign
exchange market, bond market, short-term securities market, and equity market
started functioning. The more sophisticated products linked to inter-temporal risk
trading such as warrants or options were not introduced on a significant scale. The
emerged markets were liberalized, usually formed by several major domestic
players with the strong participation of the foreign investors. However, only some of
those markets could be labeled as well-functioning. The last section (The Emerged
Financial Markets: Roles and Recommendations) summarizes the roles of financial
markets in transition, and some policy recommendations on how their performance
in facilitating the important economic activities could be improved according to the
Czech experience.
                                                                                                                                                 
in the case of success. In the both models, the existence of the anti-trust agency is necessary in
order to prevent monopolies and collusion.11
II. Main Players on the Czech
Financial Markets
In the beginning of transition, there were only two important financial
institutions in the Czech Republic - the government itself and the state one-tier
banking system. After five years, the variety as well as the number of players on the
Czech financial markets had increased immensely. The emergence of a financial
sector was pre-determined by the transitional strategy of the Czech state authorities.
The key institutions - banks and  private as well as the state funds  were formed in
the framework of the voucher privatization in which some institutions participated as
investors and others were subject to it. This section explains who were the most
important players on the Czech financial markets, how they emerged, and what the
main problems were they faced.12
II. 1.  The Role of the Central Bank
In 1990,  new laws came into effect on the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and
on Banks and Savings Banks  that restructured the one-tier banking system into a
two-tier. The central bank was separated from nine state financial institutions (out of
them 7 commercial banks), and started to fulfill its transitional tasks. The Czech
experience suggests that there are three main roles for the central bank during
transition. First, the central bank undertakes all standard tasks necessary in order to
ensure stability of the domestic currency. However, the monetary instruments
available are not as powerful as those of central banks in market economies.
Specifically, during the first transitional years, the Czech National Bank (CNB) 
3
gradually replaced non-market monetary instruments (direct credit limits, central
allocation of credits, interest rate ceilings) with market ones (minimum reserve
requirements, credit auctions and discount policies). Moreover, the design of the
monetary policy was confronted with a sequence of shocks both transformational
(VAT reform, large privatization) as well as those generated by the split of the former
Czechoslovakia (including monetary dissolution, banking and financial separation,
and a separation of the central bank itself). The CNB monetary policy created a very
stable environment for the developing financial sector since the exchange rate of the
koruna 
4 (CZK)  was successfully fixed 
5 and  inflation remained low (See Figures 1
and 2) during the whole period.
                                                
3  In January 1993, the Czech National Bank (CNB) became the central bank of the
Czech Republic - one of the successors of the former Czechoslovakia. For a simplicity, the
central bank will be referred as CNB for the whole period since we analyze the banking sector
in the Czech Republic.
4  The  koruna -the Czechoslovak crown- was a domestic currency of the former
Czechoslovakia, the Czech crown has become the currency of the Czech Republic since
February 1993.
5  Koruna was bounded to five major currencies -USD, DM, ATS, CHF, FRF after a
series of  large devaluations in 1990: 18% in January, 55% in October and 15% in December.13
Figure 1











































































































Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: A persistent relatively low inflation (10 % annually) was maintained during the first years
of transition (the reported monthly inflation is derived from the consumer price index).
The only exceptions were periods of transitional shocks - price liberalization (1991) and
VAT reform (1993).
                                                                                                                                                 
For five years, the exchange rate of  koruna remained fixed with a small modification of a
currency peg basket to USD and DM only.14
Figure 2































































































































Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: The policy of pegging the nominal exchange rate to a basket of currencies was a very
successful in the Czech Republic. The difference between the official (targeted) rate and
the market rate determined on the foreign-exchange market was insignificant.
Temporary deviations that appeared during periods of uncertainties - price liberalization
(1991) and the separation of the Czechoslovak currency (1993) - were easily
accommodated by CNB’s interventions. One of the reasons of this success was a series
of considerable devaluations of the koruna in 1990.
The second role for the central bank is to lead the transformation of the
banking sector. In 1992, a bundle of transformational targets was announced by the
CNB that was met over the next three years. The CNB coordinated the15
transformation of commercial banks payment and information systems, and it
regulated the speed of entrances to the banking sector. The Czech experience
indicates that as the financial sector develops rapidly by size as well as by a range
of activities (often introduced via a learn-by-doing process), the supervision
activities of the central bank should increase accordingly. There are several steps
that should not be overlooked during the first years of transition: strategies towards
healthier banking portfolio,
6 providing banks with the know-how concerning the
riskiness of newly introduced financial operations, a law on deposit insurance,
measures improving competition within the banking sector and a careful design for
the  privatization of large state banks.
The role of creator of short-term financial markets represents the third
important role for the central bank. The CNB contributed significantly to establishing
both the foreign-exchange as well as the money market. Specifically,  the CNB
acted as market-maker on both embryonic  markets. The  CNB’s  strategy of
gradually expanding the convertibility
7 of the koruna led to an expansion of the
markets with swaps and forwards when entrepreneurs allowed to establish foreign-
exchange accounts started hedging themselves against the exchange-rate risk in
1994.
                                                
6 In 1993, the new regulations came into effect by which banking supervision was
amended. For example, minimum required capital was increased and  more strict rules of credit
classification were implemented and monitored more strictly by the newly established
department of the CNB. In 1994, the need for additional rules emerged after the second small
bank had collapsed. The Act on Banks supplements was passed in order to provide rules for
deposit insurance and a space for the CNB to deal with problematic banks. The insurance
system was established for declared deposits limited up to 100 thousand CZK with one bank.
The  Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) was created to which  banks paid contributions (0.5% of
total declared deposits).
7 There were different stages of internal convertibility  implemented that broadened the
category of payments abroad internally carried out by means of crown accounts. Also, limits of
foreign exchange for citizens were increased several times. Finally, the law on convertibility
according to the IMF article VIII was passed in October 1995 by the Parliament.16
Also, the CNB established a new market with short-term securities, and in
the later stage when the volume of assets traded was sufficient enough, the CNB
allowed commercial  banks to  become  market makers, and only intervened since
August 1994. The main reason why the CNB undertook this role was the policy of
pegging the exchange rate. The CNB intervened on the foreign exchange market
during quite long periods of capital inflows. Hence, open-market operations became
an important CNB instrument when meeting its monetary  target. Due to
unavailability of other instruments such as government bonds, the CNB had to
become a borrower, and issue its own short-term securities (CNB-bills) in order to
sterilize inflows.
II. 2.  The Banking Sector
In the first years of transition, the banking sector expanded rapidly due to a
liberal licensing policy, the gradual opening of domestic financial markets as well as
the privatization of state commercial banks. As stated earlier, the initial size of the
transformed banking sector was seven commercial banks. The majority of large
domestic banks (Komercní  Banka, Investicní  Banka, Zivnostenska Banka, Ceska
Sporitelna) went through voucher privatization. Only Konzolidacní Banka remained
purely state owned in order to consolidate the old debts of state enterprises. By
1995, 59 commercial banks had already been established (out of which 1 state, 17
domestic commercial banks, 14 with mixed ownership, 11 with full foreign
ownership, 10 foreign branch offices), 41 representations of foreign banks and 6
building and loan associations. Moreover, laws on savings and credit cooperatives
were being discussed  and a new Act on Banking was being prepared that would
support the development of mortgage banking with state participation (the support17
of long-term credits financing construction).
8 The Czech Export Bank was
established in order to promote the export performance of the Czech Republic. In
addition to banks, 33 insurance companies (and 40 branches) competed with
banks for savings of private sector.
Not only did the Czech banking sector develop by size, the variety of its activities
increased over the five years as well. In addition to basic banking activities such as
accepting deposits, granting credits and ensuring payments, there were new
services provided including securities trading, management of securities portfolio,
exchange-rate hedging and channeling of international funds to domestic clients.
Specifically, some major banks started speculating on the world market with futures,
and collected loans abroad.
The rapidly developing banking sector was burdened with several problems
during the first years of transition. First, the quality of  banks´ portfolios was
considerable lowered by bad debts inherited from the previous regime as well as
newly granted bad loans. In 1992, the government introduced a write off program in
which debts of 50 billion CZK were swapped into state bonds. Bonds were given to
the state commercial banks in order to determine those customers whose debts
should be written off.  Capek (1995) argues that, as a consequence, good
customers were punished since banks had chosen debts with the lowest probability
of repayment for cancellation imposing soft budget constraint on bad customers.
Capek (1995) also demonstrates that the share of bad loans in the total amount of
granted credits increased. It stood at 19% in 1992 and 24% in 1993. In 1994, the
new methodology of credit classification was introduced. If this change is accounted
for, the bad loans stood at 25% of the total granted credits in 1994 and 26% in
1995. The importance of the problem was confirmed by the collapse of several
small banks due to their insolvency, and a consequent lack of liquidity. Despite this,
public confidence in the banking sector was not threatened because a deposit
insurance law was passed in 1994. However, as a result, the expenses of the
                                                
8 In 1996, 6 mortgage banks  operated on the Czech financial markets.18
banking sector already high due to building up reserves increased further preventing
banks from lowering rates on credits to clients.
The second problem that led to imperfections on some financial markets, as
analyzed later in the next section, was the structure of the banking sector. Although
there was an expansion of the banking industry, the post-privatization structure can
be characterized as inherited for two reasons. First, the major banks (those
originally state owned) were not restructured during the period of voucher
privatization. The only exception was a fusion of two major banks into Investicni a
Postovni Banka. Second, the new comers -both branches of foreign banks and new
domestic banks - were not sufficiently large to increase competition in the banking
industry. Foreign banks were allowed entry mainly to serve their own clients, and did
not aim to gain power on the domestic market by means of increased competition.
Both types of banks are in this paper referred to as small banks. Indicators of the
concentration of the Czech banking sector suggest that large privatized banks
remained the leaders in the banking industry (See Table 1) collecting the majority of
domestic savings as well as international loans and granting credits to the majority
of clients. Specifically, the previously state owned saving bank (Ceska Sporitelna)
had a monopolist position on primary deposit market in the first years of transition.
Table 1
Structure of the Czech Banking Sector in 1995
Bank’s Own Capital
% of Own Capital of Banking Sector
Number of Banks in a  Category
                     20     -  15%   1
                     14.9  -  10%   1
                       9.9  -    5%   3
                       4.9  -    1%   2
                    less than 1% 4519
Data Source: CNB,  Hospodarske Noviny (Economic News).
Notes: According to the total asset criteria, in 1994 the large banks accounted for 79.3% of the
banking sector, small domestic banks for 8.8%, and foreign banks (including branches)
11.2%. In 1995, the large banks accounted for 73.7%, small domestic banks for 9.2%,
and foreign banks (including branches) for 16%.
Third, the banking sector was involved in the voucher privatization scheme.
Not only could banks invest a limited portion of collected deposits in equities
directly, they also have funded investment privatization funds (IPFs) so they could
bid for larger stocks of voucher shares through them. Commercial banks  have even
been locked into the ownership circle with either other banks’ funds or with their own
clients. This outcome of voucher privatization is likely to have important
consequences for the managing of banking portfolios.
There are two main scenarios for the banks to deal with concerning the new
equity market. First, banks will decide to “keep a wall” between themselves and
their IPFs, they will monitor them until the funds’ debts are repaid. After that, the
banks will have a relatively small  portion of their portfolios invested in equities.
Although it stood at about 10% in 1995, an OECD analysis argued that reserves
which the banking sector managed to build in order to cover bad loans were not
high enough to cover  the losses from trading with securities (specially, due to a
steady fall in prices on the stock exchange). According to the second scenario, the
banks will maintain the credit link to their IPFs by swapping debts into equities. The
banks will become heavily involved in all activities of majority  shareholders, and will
face the problems of monitoring, enforcing and incentives in the  privatized state
enterprises. It is difficult to judge which scenario will prevail. On the one hand, a
bankruptcy law came  into effect in 1993 but  banks did not start acting as owners
until 1995. On the other hand, one of the large banks (Investicni a Postovni Banka)
has already started swapping equities of its IPFs into deposit certificates. Other
banks have protected their IPFs against takeovers by other financial institutions.
Both scenarios imply that banks will be affected by the development on the equity20
market in the medium term either directly via results of  their own speculative
activities or indirectly via the ability of IPFs to repay debts.
II. 3.  The Role of the Government
The Czech experience reveals that a variety of roles for the government on
the field of financial markets is very broad during transition. First, the government
initiates the existence of the majority of the main players either directly as a part of
its institutional reform (an independent central bank, major banks, pension funds,
stock exchange) or indirectly by creating a framework for a new financial market
(voucher investment funds, mortgage banking, insurance companies). Second,
similarly to the central bank, the government acts as an institutional leader since it
helps to create both equity as well as  bond market. An interesting lesson about the
importance of the institutional leader that bears the costs of a market creation can
be drawn from the Czech experience. While the equity market boomed because of
the privatization strategy of government, the bond market remained thin since the
government did not accept any strategy to support development of this part of the
capital market. Third, the Ministry of Finance gives licenses to all non-banking
financial institutions the list of which is summarized in the next paragraph, and
supervises these institutions. Moreover, the government is according to the Czech
experience a main issuer of bonds in the early stages of transition.
Fourth, not only is the government a major player on a bond market, it can
temporarily be - as suggested by the Czech case - a very important player on equity
market.
9 Specifically, in 1991, the National Property Fund (NPF) was established by
                                                
9 While the government can continue issuing bonds and intervening on bond market after
transitional period is over, it operates on equity market only temporarily. The government´s fund
sells equities during the privatization process but it does not buy them on a large scale. Hence its
role diminishes gradually.21
the government as a temporary  transitional institution. The NPF together with the
Ministry of Privatization transformed state-owned enterprises that were subject to
privatization into joint-stock companies, organized direct sales, restitution and a
voucher privatization scheme.
10 However, as a result of voucher privatization the last
wave of which took place in 1994, the NPF was still a powerful  player on the equity
market even in 1995 since it was responsible for managing shares remaining in
state hands. According to NPF reports, 1742 state enterprises were transformed
into join-stock companies worth 750 billion CZK during the privatization process. In
1995, the NPF held shares in 1119 companies worth 230 billion CZK which was
approximately the same amount as all private IPFs together. The NPF was involved
in one half of trade with Czech shares until 1995. Consequently, the NPF could
easily affect trading and prices on equity market.
It is worth noting that although the major commercial  banks have gone
through voucher privatization, the NPF has remained the majority shareholder in
them (See Table 2). The optimal speed of privatization of the state portion of shares
was difficult to determine. On one hand, the resulting institutional structure
(sometimes referred to as “bank socialism”) was identified by some authors 
11 as a
potential source of inefficiency in the Czech transitional economy. On the other hand,
world rating agencies (e.g. Standard and Poor's) gave only these banks with a
positive rating which was close to the very good rating of the Czech Republic
because they considered these banks as low risky due to the state guarantee.
12
Also, these banks had access to international funds, and were able to collect them
at a rate very close to LIBOR.
                                                
10 The revenues from sales of shares went mainly to inter-firm debt clearing operations of
state enterprises and re-capitalization of commercial banks. For more detailed description of the
Czech privatization process see Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle (1993).
11 See for example Èapek, Mertlík (1996).
12 Although all the small banks were not considered by rating agencies - so it is not
possible to judge in general which category of banks has received a better rating - the included
small banks did not get equally good rating.22
Table 2











 Ownership of NPF 48% 45% 67% * 33% 26%
Data Source: NPF.
Note: * Together with the CNB and the Czech government.
II. 4.  Non-Banking Financial Institutions
Due to the Czech privatization scheme, other institutional reforms of the
government and the liberal government licensing policy, a large variety of non-
banking private financial institutions emerged during the transition (See Table 3).
Table 3
The Non-Banking Financial Sector in 1995
Type of  Institution Number of Institutions
 Securities Markets       3
 Pension Funds     44
 Insurance Companies     33
 Investment Companies   162
 Investment Privatization Funds   272
 Mutual Funds   283
 Security Dealers *   389
 Brokers   93223
Data Source: Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, CNB.
Notes: Leasing companies have become an important part of non-banking financial sector. They
started providing the so called secondary credits but were not subject to banking
regulations.          *) 45 ot them
banks.
The state authorities initiated the emergence of three securities markets. The
institutional framework was created by The Securities Act, The Societies and
Investment Funds Act and The Stock Exchange Act in 1992. The Prague Stock
Exchange (PSE), the over-the counter-system (RM-S) and the Securities Center
(SC) for direct trading with shares were funded. The three markets  differ in the
method and speed of settlement, price setting, liquidity, costs of trading, price levels
and the volumes of trading. The PSE is a major official market where main players
licensed by the PSE (such as banks, investment funds or companies) trade among
themselves. Small private investors have access to the PSE only via these
intermediaries. The RM-S is an official market oriented towards small investors -
mainly households who were given the initial stock of shares during the voucher
privatization scheme. However, the SC that facilitates direct trading between the two
parties was the most important market in the first years of transition. Consequently,
the information content of the PSE or RM-S index  was low. The role of equity prices
as  signals for investment activities was distorted since the SC prices were not
announced in the fist stage of the market emergence. In 1995, the PSE facilitated
33.9% of total trading volume, the share of the RM-S was 4.4%, and the share of the
SC was 61.7%.
In 1994, the number of pension funds and insurance companies started
increasing due to the newly formed institutional framework (the new law on pension
insurance was passed in November 1994). There were many  IPFs, mutual funds
and private investment companies funded that competed for citizens’ vouchers
during the two waves of voucher privatization. The bidding process was a prototype
of the  bottom to top process. An unexpectedly large number of  funds was24
established, and functioned as a very important factor driving the formation of the
Czech capital market. In addition, many security traders and brokers started
speculating on the Czech financial markets. The above-listed financial institutions
have been supervised by the Ministry of Finance.
13
                                                
13 In the beginning of 1996, some private IPFs started transforming themselves into holding
companies in order to avoid the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The agreement of
shareholders’ meeting was the only condition for the change in status.2526
III. Financial Markets in Transition:
     Structure, Reasons for Emergence
     and the Depth of the Czech
     Financial Markets
The main feature of the whole process of markets’ emergence was the quick
sequence of institutional reforms that were followed by the expansion of foreign
investors activities as well as a variety of newly emerging private domestic financial
institutions. According to the Heritage Foundation Index,
14 during the transition
period, Czech financial markets were one of the most free markets with patterns
similar to Asian countries. This section aims to answer the following three questions.
How wide were financial markets in the Czech Republic after five years of
transition? Why did various markets emerge? How deep were they?
                                                
14 The index evaluates banking systems, monetary policies, taxation, output consumed by
government, regulations, volumes of black market, wage and price controls.27
III. 1.  Money market
The money market institution was established in 1991. However, in the first
two years, the number of monetary instruments was very small. The  majority  of
operations was performed by granting credits directly. There was a  “parallel”
market created in the form of trade credits used by enterprises in order to overcome
a credit crunch. Although there was a disproportionate liquidity between the major
commercial banks (surplus of primary resources) and small banks (lack of
resources), large banks did not trade on the inter-bank money market since they
preferred lending to state authorities. Consequently, the inter-bank money market
rates remained high and the volumes traded were not significant (see Figure 3). The
discriminating attitude of major banks toward newly established smaller banks was
one of the consequences of the inherited structure of the banking sector. Only
foreign banks were not subject to this attitude, having access to foreign resources.
In the later stage of transition, a persistent capital inflow contributed
significantly to the inter-bank money market development since it was necessary for
large banks to redistribute foreign resources among domestic investors.
Subsequently, the inter-bank money market rates started falling followed by  client
rates. In 1994 and 1995, the money market expanded further. More interest rates
were quoted, more commercial banks were acting as reference banks, trading
volumes increased and new forms of trade were implemented such as  repo-
operations. The spread between the offer rate on the money market and rate on
short-term deposits fell from 1,63% in 1993 to 0,89% in 1995. The short-term rates
(up to 3-month rates) became “true” market prices due to increasing trading
volumes on the money market.28
Figure 3






























































































































































Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: In the first two years of transition, inter-bank money market rates were high as shown by
Pribor-3 - the three-month Prague Inter-bank Offer Rate (scaled on the right-hand
side). Trading between banks was not significant, and the CNB was refinancing smaller
bank with its credits. In the later stage, inter-bank rates fell except for period of
uncertainty (currency dissolution in 1993) although the CNB intervened with its bills
from 1994 to neutralize excessive liquidity from the capital inflows. Refinancing credits
remained stable since commercial banks  started trading credits among themselves.
Due to capital inflows, the CNB entered the money market when applying its
sterilisation policy of issuing CNB-bills (See Figure 4). As a result, a new market
with short-term securities was created. Interestingly, the bills were perfect
substitutes for money because the CNB ensured fully their liquidity. In 1995, the
market started widening when other institutions such as the NPF or large29
commercial banks followed the central bank in issuing short-term bills. Due to the
higher liquidity that was a consequence of the expansion of money market as well
as an improved self-discipline of enterprises, a parallel market of trade credits
stopped increasing.
Figure 4



























































































































































































Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: The market with CNB-bills emerged in 1993. In the very beginning, interest rates on
bills (scaled on the right-hand side) were set by the CNB. However, since  the
expansion in issuing CNB-bills in 1994, the  rates fell  determined by the market. The
volumes of CNB-bills held by commercial banks increased due to the  CNB´s
sterilization policy.30
III. 2.  The Foreign Exchange Market
The Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market was founded in 1991 to secure the
internal convertibility of the koruna. The CNB and commercial banks licensed by the
CNB were the major participants. After a large devaluation of the koruna in 1990,
rapid  development of the foreign exchange  market was possible due to persistent
capital inflows. The CNB  continued accumulating foreign exchange reserves for the
next five years
15 (see Figure 5). Gradually, the rules for open-foreign-exchange
positions were liberalized. Since 1994 participants have traded among themselves
on daily fixing where the CNB intervened abandoning its position of a market-
maker. Trading among commercial banks become a major type of transitions on
the foreign exchange market signaling that the market had overcome its embryonic
stage. In 1995, the convertibility of the koruna according to Article VIII of the IMF was
introduced. As a consequence, a market with forwards and swaps developed
gradually, and it was expected that it would develop extensively once the fluctuation
bands around the central parity are broadened. The markets with more
sophisticated products were not well-established since  the fixed-exchange-rate
regime did not burden private sector with exchange-rate risk. Hence there was no
market pressure to start trading with futures or options.
                                                
15  The Czech Republic was very successful in building its foreign exchange reserves. The
CNB even paid ahead of schedule the credits by IMF, and the Czech Republic  became a
creditor vis-a-vis the IMF.31
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Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: Foreign reserves of the Czech Republic have been only reported since 1992. Both the
CNB as well as commercial banks built up their reserves gradually. The share of CNB
reserves was increasing due to  sterilization measures. The only period of a fall in
reserves was in the first quarter of 1993 when the expectations of currency dissolution
resulted into a significant  capital outflow.
III. 3.  The Capital Market
In the Czech Republic, the equity market was leading the process of capital
market emergence although at the start of the transition the capital market had been
restricted to a preliminary bond market on which only a very limited number of
issues was auctioned.  Due to a government surplus there was no large issue of
state bonds. The only other traded bonds were those of Komercni  Banka. The32
equity market  boomed  in the second half of 1993 when the first wave of voucher
privatization was completed and the second wave started.
16 Trading with shares
significantly increased both the width (number of traded issues) and the depth
(volumes of trading) of the capital market. For example, the number of issues traded
on the PSE increased from 9 to 630 in June 1993. In November, shares of
investment funds further enlarged the number of traded issues.
Figure 6 demonstrates the size of the boom in the capital market by looking
at the trading on the PSE.
17 Several phases of development of the equity market
can be distinguished.
18 In general, due to a mismatch of supply and demand  and
due to other limiting factors,
19 it took some time for trading volumes to increase. The
equity market grew slowly, prices declined until September 1993. Then the
embryonic stage was passed. Undervalued shares were traded at a larger scale,
and prices started rising. Specifically, shares of banks and large enterprises on
which sufficient information was available were demanded. At the end of 1993,
trading volumes  were enlarged because the investment  funds needed to meet
                                                
16 In May, voucher shares were traded for the first time on the RM-system in periodical
auctions. The period between auctions was being shortened gradually from seven to two weeks
(later on the RM-S started running continuous auctions as well). In June, voucher shares were
traded for the first time on the Prague Stock Exchange.
17   Trading on the PSE has been chosen as an indicator of development for two reasons.
First, in general, demand for shares came  from the other sectors than households - the initially
targeted sector. As a result, the RM-S to which households had access directly, was not a
decisive market, and followed the expansionist tendency only slowly. Second, the unofficial
trading organized  directly between sellers and buyers was not reported by the Center of
Securities until 1995 although the official trading was approximated to be only 20% of the total
trading with voucher shares. Hence both trading volumes and prices on PSE  should be
understood as indicators only.
18 The summary is based on the analysis of the Czech capital market published weekly in
Hospodarske  Noviny (Economic News), and on the analysis of  CNB’s experts that are
available in Annual Reports of the CNB.
19 Among main factors that limited trading in the first months of capital market’s existence
were technical and administrative barriers that diminished gradually in a learn-by-doing process.33
legal requirements on their portfolios before the deadline.
20 In the first half of 1994,
both  prices and volumes on the stock market increased pushed mainly by high
demand for shares of ‘market leaders’.
21 After the initial re-distribution of voucher
shares, the illnesses of the emerging market affected trade volumes and  prices on
the market with shares from the second half of 1994.
Figure 6














































































































































































Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: Volume of trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (scaled on the left-hand side)
describes the process of emergence of the Czech capital market. Significant official
trading appeared only after the first wave of voucher privatization was finished in June
                                                
20 Specifically, the portion of shares that  funds could hold in one enterprise was restricted.
Another hypothesis suggests that investment funds aimed to increase the market price of their
portfolios in order to charge higher fees to customers in the end of the year.
21 Shares of commercial  banks, glass producers, Czech Energetic Complex were among
the most important market leaders.34
1993 (only since then have price indexes been available). The second boom came in
1995 with the second wave of voucher privatization.
There was a  lack of domestic liquidity. Moreover, domestic investors were
disappointed by the poor protection of minority shareholders, low dividends and
falling prices. It is interesting to note that there were several signs of inefficiency in
the equity market - the room for arbitrage trading between the two official markets
and prices not-reflecting the dividend performance of companies.
22 Foreign
institutional investors complained that there was a lack of information on smaller
enterprises as well as on the volumes and prices from direct trading. Also, a part of
the foreign demand for Czech financial assets was absorbed into the newly
emerged money and bond markets. In 1995, the importance of the equity market
increased further because shares from the second wave of voucher privatization
were issued. Subsequently, prices of shares stopped falling. The increased market
depth and width were not the only improvements. The Czech Capital Information
Agency has been established with the aim to improve the quality and quantity of
information available to investors. The credibility of the market increased when the
Czech Republic entered OECD.
In comparison to the equity market, the bond market unaffected by voucher
privatization remained thin. The share of bonds in the total trading on the PSE
increased from 5% in 1993 to 30% in 1995 (See Figure 7). The initial very small
stock of state bonds that formed the quoted bond market was not increased at a
larger rate due to the government’s strategy of a balanced budget. Only from 1994,
several new issues of corporate bonds (the City of Prague, Czech  Energetical
Complex and  Komercni  Banka) have been quoted on the PSE. The under-
developed market with state bonds made allocation decisions more difficult since
there was no information on the market price of a risk-free long-term asset available
                                                
22 However, less than 10% of companies traded on the PSE offered dividends in 1994.
Hence the general fall in prices could be understood as a natural consequence of low dividends
and high uncertainty involved.35
to portfolio makers and potential corporate bond issuers. As a result of
uncertainties, the unquoted bond market did not develop, and in general, companies
did not issue new bonds in order to raise funds.
Figure 7



























































































































































































Data Source:  Annual Reports (1991-1995), CNB.
Notes: The make up of securities traded on the PSE demonstrates the relative importance of
market with voucher shares and bonds in the first years of transition in the Czech
Republic. In 1993 when the capital market emerged the voucher shares were the major
traded asset. In 1994, the PSE started to quote some of voucher shares that were
considered most liquid, profitable and of low risk. Only in 1995 did bonds start to be
traded on a larger scale. However, the unquoted bond market which could serve as a
means of raising finances for companies lacking access to bank credits did not develop.
As was said, the structure of trading on the PSE had only limited information
content. For this reason, the ratios of the stock of four considered categories of
financial assets (money, voucher shares, government bonds and corporate bonds)36
and the gross domestic product might better indicate the depth of the respective
financial markets (Table 4).
23
Table 4
The Depth of  the Financial Markets in the Czech Republic (1995)
Financial Asset The Stock of Asset as % of GDP
 Money (M2)                     85.56%
 Equities *                     39.19%
 Government bonds                       6.93%
 Corporate bonds                       2.00%
Data Source: CNB, NPF, Ministry of Finance.
Note: * The majority of equities belongs to a category of voucher shares.
According to this indicator, in 1995 the money market was relatively deep
(one of the deepest among the transitional markets). The market capitalization was
48%. Voucher shares remained the leading asset of the capital market. There were
several consequences of a very thin bond market. As already stated, the sterilized
intervention of the central bank was difficult, and the CNB created a market with
short-term bills because of that.
24 The anchor for issues of corporate bonds was
missing on the capital market.
In addition, the supply of quoted bonds was considered to be below the level
that domestic institutions could absorb, especially, when pension and insurance
institutions were funded. Given the rates of 2% above inflation, the Czech capital
                                                
23 The volume of trading on the PSE as a share of GDP stood at 1% for shares and 0.1%
for bonds in 1993, at 4% for shares and 2% for bonds in 1994, and at 12% for shares and
10% for bonds in 1995.
24 Due to inefficiencies of emerging markets, the success of monetary and exchange-rate
policies relies relatively more on the coordination between the central bank and the government
during transition. It is interesting to mention that although the Czech government did not support
the central bank by developing the bond market, some atypical actions were employed as
temporary fiscal policy tools. Specifically, when the  sterilization of capital inflow proved to be
difficult, the NPF withdrew its funds from commercial banks to the CNB.37
market absorbed the primary issues at prices above their nominal values implying
an  excess demand for low-risky securities. Consequently, newly funded pension
institutions ended up with a rather atypical portfolio of assets relying on time
deposits in commercial banks instead of bonds. Hence, together with voucher
privatization, even pension insurance became a concern of the universal
commercial banks.38
IV. The Emerged Financial Markets:
      Roles and Policy
      Recommendations
There is general agreement on  the meaning of the concept of well-
functioning financial markets.
25 They ensure mobilization of domestic savings,
efficient allocation of funds, enforcement of budgetary constraint, properly defined
incentives for managers, and efficient monitoring of enterprises. Since their
efficiency promotes investment, they are an important factor of economic growth.
This section tries to analyze how good the emerged financial markets in the Czech
Republic were in fulfilling those roles, and to summarize some policy
recommendations on how their performance could be improved.
As was said, there was immense expansion in the variety  as well as the
number of financial institutions operating on the Czech financial markets. However,
neither this boom attracted more savings nor promoted competition for deposits.
The saving ratio reported in the balance of income and expenditures of households
                                                
25 See for example Stiglitz (1990) for the summary.39
was nearly constant and relatively low over the period. It stood at about 10%. The
spread between average interest rates on credits and deposits remained high. It
was 6.3% in 1992, 7.1% in 1993, 5.75% in 1994 and 5.82% in 1995. There were
two main reasons for low mobilization of domestic savings: (i) due to a strategy of
fast financial liberalization, financial institutions had a relatively easy access to
cheaper foreign funds, and (ii) there was no alternative well-developed market to
which households could channel their savings. Hence the banks did not need to
compete for domestic deposits. Since the Czech housing market has been
distorted, and the law on mortgages has been passed, the relatively low domestic
savings may cause problems in the future. According to experience of developing
countries, if the housing scheme is introduced, households tend to switch their
savings into the housing program, they stop lending to enterprises, and investment
is depressed. Moreover, the banking sector that mobilizes savings help reducing
demand pressures on inflation.
As far as the role of financial markets in the promotion of investment is
concerned, there was no immediate impact of their development observed during
the first five years of transition. The investment grew significantly. It stood at 30.2%
of GDP in 1992, 28.25% in 1993, 32.12% in 1994 and 35.73% in 1995. However,
according to the Czech Statistical Office, the most significant part of it was financed
from internal sources. In 1993, 73% of investment was financed internally, 17% from
bank credits, 5% from subsidies, 2% from abroad and 3% from other sources. It is
worth noting that the most important external source of investment funds were
credits by domestically registered banks since the boom of equity market did not
bring any funds to enterprises (the shares were either transferred from the state to
the private sector via vouchers or sold to foreign investors through the NPF that
used the revenues for overcoming the transitional problems such as old bank
debts). Table 5 gives us an interesting result.40
Table 5
Investment Credits and Fixed Investment in the CR
(in billion CZK)
 Investment Credits to Enterprises 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
 Short-Term Credits       1,6      9,0     16,8       9,7    11,6
 Medium-Term Credits     35,8    56,2     71,9     67,0    68,7
 Long-Term Credits     71,7    63,0     65,3     65,1    69,7
 Total Investment Credits (TIC)   109,1  128,2   154,0   141,8  150,0
 Change in TIC -    19,1     25,8    -12,2      8,2
 Fixed Investment * -  122,6   113,2   132,8  154,2
Data Source: CNB, Czech Statistical Office.
Note: *Investment at current prices.
In 1992, a change in total investment credits stood at 15.5% of fixed
investment. In 1995, this share fell to 5.3%. This implies that the most important
market with investment funds was not expanding. Moreover, the non-decreasing
share of bad loans in the total amount of granted credits 
26 did not signal that the
banking sector improved the efficiency of fund allocation. In summary, the banking
sector did not expand its activities in the redistribution of resources from the
traditional net lender (households) to the net borrower (enterprises) significantly
(See Figure 8).
There was a relatively stable increase in net deposits of households (the
growth rate was three times lower in real terms). However, the amount of net credits
to the whole private sector fell. Since the banking sector has partially switched to
other forms of financing enterprises such as investing into corporate bonds, it is
likely that the intermediary role of banks remained rather stable. The switch from
credits to other forms of financing might appear due to tight monetary policy of the
                                                
26 The shares are reported on pp. 9: 19% in 1992, 24% in 1993, 25 % in 1994 and 26%
in 1995.41
CNB in the second half of 1995, and was allowed by a starting expansion of the
corporate bond market.
Figure 8































































































































































































Note:  The indicators are defined as follows. Net deposits of households = checkable deposits
of households plus time deposits of households minus credits to households. Net credits
to enterprises = credits to enterprises minus checkable deposits minus time deposits of
enterprises. Net credits to private sector = net credits to enterprises minus net deposits
of households.
In this paper, the long-term credit market was identified as the main
determinant of the growth of externally financed investment.  Bernanke, Blinder
(1988) argue that there is a  strong  link between availability of  credits and
economic growth. In this context, the main problem of the Czech capital markets
seem to be a shortening of the time horizon. According to the CNB, the share of
long-term credits in total credits fell during the transition. It stood at 42% in 1991,42
36% in 1992, 30% in 1993, 29% in 1994 and 26% in 1995. Interestingly,  Fischer,
Reisen (1992) relate the problem of the shortening of the time horizon to the under-
developed bond market 
27 and to a lack of information. The Czech experience
supports this general analysis. In order to promote the long-term activities of banks,
the state authorities can assist in developing rating agencies. The weak bond
market should be strengthened by swapping the transitional government debt from
its atypical forms into long-term bonds.
28 This would improve the portfolio quality of
all leading players - commercial banks, pension funds and the central bank, and
enlarge their horizon when extending investment credits. The other alternative could
be to expand the domestic market with foreign government bonds through which
banks could  diversify their portfolio more broadly.
The Czech experience also suggests that during the transition, financial
institutions promoted the role of activities other than the allocation of funds. They
were more involved in short-term operations (and speculations), and they
accomplished the most important role of the secondary markets - forming the new
ownership structure during the transition. Specifically, the equity market facilitated
an enormous process - the concentration of ownership. While during the official two
                                                
27 According to their study, the absence of the well-developed market with government
bonds makes allocation decisions more difficult since there is no market price of a risk-free
long-term asset available. Hence domestic markets tend to be very sensitive to  foreign demand
because of a lack of domestic long-term financial sources. Moreover, there are other serious
consequences. Banks have to absorb all shocks, the open-market operations are not effective,
and other tools are used such as changes in minimum reserve requirements that  can cause
repression of domestic banking sector.
28 This argument was developed by the participants of the workshop on macro-modeling
organized by the Ministry of Finance in April 1996. During transition there are some government
debts in the form of credits or the state participation in the other institutions´ balance sheets.
These liabilities can be transformed into the state debt. Although it may seen to be a paradox
that government should try to enlarge its stock of debts, this swap would help financial
institutions to diversify their portfolio as well as clarify the position of various institutions linked to
the government. For example, some assets of the state bank (Konzolidacni Banka) that served
as “a  hospital” for banks are in fact liabilities of the government, and could be easily
transformed into the state bonds.43
waves of voucher privatization, state enterprises were transferred into the hands of 8
million small shareholders, during the unofficial “third wave of voucher privatization”
IPFs started forming small groups of inside owners. For example,  IPFs started
colluding when voting on shareholders meetings.
29 According to the Center for
Securities, approximately one half of the small shareholders cashed their shares
before 1995.
The appearance of the third wave indicated that the emerged financial
markets started fulfilling their roles in the screening and monitoring process. Stiglitz
(1990) explains the advantages of strong inside groups of investors in enterprises.
In comparison to the market model with widespread ownership, due to returns to
scale as well as the long-lasting relationship between clients and banks - inside
owners, it is relatively easier for creditors to screen investment projects (to collect
information in order to decide among projects), to monitor them (to ensure that funds
are used according to the project) and to initiate bankruptcy or replace management
if the project is not followed or loans are not repaid. Hence if the third wave is
successful, the problems of information asymmetry as well as the free rider problem
will be eliminated to a large extent. For example, Capek (1995) reports that large
enterprises previously owned by the state received cheaper credits. This could be
explained as a consequence of the circle of ownership formed during voucher
privatization which reduced information asymmetry between large banks and their
clients.
30
                                                
29 Although there was a regulation on  a single IPF to hold less than  20% of shares in a
single company (and a single company could not account for more than 20% of IPF’s assets),
the funds colluded when voting on shareholders meetings. Hence in fact, they exchange
ownership rights tacitly.
30 The circle ownership was not the only link between banks, IPFs and enterprises. The
other very important factor that lowered information asymmetry was a credit-deposit link among
banks and enterprises. According to unofficial discussions with bank managers, banks invested
into equities of their old clients (both debtors as well as depositors). Also, they invested into
equities of good customers of other banks, and initiated the establishing of such a link during
shareholders meetings.  The main aim was to attract the large deposits of good customers, and44
With the banks (and their IPFs), the privatized enterprises would be on a
short leash. Hence the incentive structure of the managers would be improved after
banks develop the know-how necessary for monitoring  projects. Since the Czech
financial markets seem to be converging towards the banking model, the authorities
can improve their performance by overcoming the well-known problems of this
model.
31 For example, Stiglitz (1990) shows that managers of enterprises expect
credits to be extended since the enforcement of contracts is difficult and costly. It is
a very appropriate assumption for a transitional economy in which even the banks
under the state control were reluctant to initiate the bankruptcy processes of large
debtors.  Corbett, Mayer (1991) and Fischer,  Reisen (1992) follow a similar
reasoning. They argue that government policies towards financial markets can
improve their functioning significantly. The main function of the secondary markets is
seen in rent seeking activities with low net social value since the information
provided by them cannot be used for long-term investment. Hence the freeing up of
those markets is not necessarily welfare improving. Studies conclude that there is a
need for very strong securities and fraud laws, laws on bankruptcies and collaterals.
They should be introduced in the early stage of reform. The studies also expose the
second disadvantage of the banking model - it encourages collusion. Strong anti-
trust agencies are needed to prevent market distortions.
32
                                                                                                                                                 
to sell  them own services. The credit-deposit link in the form of  trade credits related also a lot
of banks’ customers among themselves. One of the reasons of the emergence of trade credits is
that information asymmetry is lower between two trading partners than between the bank and a
new customer.
31 In the surveyed literature, there is agreement that if the control problem is not solved by
financial markets in the banking model, there are two alternatives (i) the total loss of the control
due to sales of enterprises abroad and (ii) return of control to the state hands. Non of them
ensures economic growth.
32 This disadvantage is common for both market and banking model. In the market model,
hostile takeovers take place. Hence the anti-trust agency should work in this model as well in
order to prevent monopolies.45
According to  Caprio (1995),  high capital adequacy and strong bank
regulation are necessary since banks own newly introduced, risky equities. OECD
regulations seem to be too weak for banks during the transition due to relatively
higher risk as well as a lack of experience of supervisors. Hence the targeted
regulations should not be accepted in the early stages of transition. Caprio (1995)
also argues that since banking supervision is weak in the early stages of transition,
some incentive structure should be developed for banks to follow the regulations.
For example, banks with good results can borrow at a discount window at a more
favorable interest rate or can have the privilege to facilitate official loans for the
government or other state authorities. Weak supervision should be strengthened by
the presence of representatives of the NPF at banks’ boards in order to reduce
information asymmetry that the supervising authority faces.
This brings us to a very important  problem the Czech experience has
revealed. It is a question of a strategy in privatizing the large banks in which the NPF
was still a majority shareholder after five years of transition. Caprio (1995) identifies
a privatization strategy as the determination of the future performance of all sectors.
The importance of the problem is stressed by the likely convergence towards the
banking model. Two main approaches can be distinguished. First, the fast
privatization of the banks would follow the strategy chosen by the Czech government
for enterprises. It is argued that the control problem would be solved (the
government is “a poor manager”) by determining private owners. However, since
there is a lack of domestic savings, the only institutions that could bid for bank
shares would be foreign investors or banks themselves when borrowing abroad.
Consequently, there is  a danger of the loss of a control as described in Stiglitz
(1990). Second, a different strategy of privatization is chosen for banks. The
privatization of the controlling block of shares is postponed, and there is some
targeted portion of shares that would remain in the state hands at least in the
medium run.46
The Czech experience seems to confirm some arguments given in  Caprio
(1995). There are several advantages in the second approach: (i) Credibility of the
state banks is higher than that of newly established small banks, the “visible” state
ownership is a form of guarantee and prevents runs, (ii) State presence in large
commercial banks affects foreign investors positively. These banks are easily able
to raise funds abroad at low cost, and receive better ratings similar to that of the
country. In the case of rapid privatization, it is difficult to predict how international
capital flows would react. There is a danger of outflows and a subsequent credit
crunch, (iii) It is difficult for banks to behave in a safe manner during transition since
the amount as well as quality of information on financial assets (credits including)
increases only slowly. For example, some prices were still not liberalized in 1995.
The information content provided by trading on the PSE was lowered by the large
volumes of unofficial trading. The financial market with long-term funds did not signal
well after five years of transition. Hence the problem of screening was extremely
difficult for banks to overcome. Moreover, some information was available to the
government (e.g. prize liberalization scheme) rather than to private banks (this
additional temporary information asymmetry might be reduced by the presence of
the state in the banking), (iv) It takes time for banking supervisors to learn their role.
Hence the role of the NPF in reducing the information asymmetry is important during
transition, (v) There are other important financial institutions dependent on the
banking sector’s performance. Specifically, a significant portion of pension funds
assets are time deposits with commercial banks. In the case of a capital outflow,
pension funds could request significant subsidies from the government.
In summary, there might be useful lessons derived for other transitional
countries from the Czech experience. Specifically, the costly supervision of the large
number of banks including the rescue operations of some of them was not
outweighed by the benefits from more efficient banking sector’s activities. Hence
the strategy of slower financial liberalization in the sense of providing fewer licenses
at the beginning of transition might be considered as an alternative way of financial47
reform. The privatization of large banks requires a very careful design since the high
speed of the process does not  ensure significant improvement in the efficiency of
financial markets.48
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